The paper argues that certain themes of general relevance can be highlighted, while at the same time acknowledging that particular policies have to be fashioned in the light of sui generis circumstances. First, strategic, coherent and long-term approaches to the processes of transition are not integrated into the agendas and implementing mechanisms of interventionist policy-making institutions. Second, there is an imbalance between short-term, ‘hard’, visible reconstruction meaures and ’soft’, long-term civil society programmes. Third, the humanitarian dimension has been geared towards social engineering rather than towards civil development based on local ownership of the peacebuilding process. In this last aspect, a distinction might be made between social engineering that promotes change in civil, political and demographic structures (by holding elections, by fostering refugee returns, for example), and civil development that emphasises change in the way power relationships are expressed (by for example, promoting transparency and accountability in both external assistance to war-torn societies and in generating local civil society).

The first section of the paper begins by examining the need for attention to transitions, the lack of coherence that arises from neoliberal pressures for subcontracting and the retraction of state welfare provision, and the problems that arise from assumptions that rehabilitation is part of a relief to development continuum. The next section addresses the continuities in war-torn societies that have to be addressed in analysing the social-civil dimension of rehabilitation. They include the perpetuation of security risks, guerilla war economies, military provision of humanitarian aid and the power relationships established by external actors. The third section considers the concept of ‘transformation’ of society in transitions to relative peace, the obstacles that exist to transformation, the limits of social engineering and the role that external agents can play by adapting concepts of accountability and evaluation to particular situations.

1. The Hill proposal was adopted within the framework of the attempt by the international community to address the issue of Kosova as one of autonomy and to reject any claims for independence. It must be realized that this basic approach obviously determines the flavour of the agreement throughout.
2. The agreement exhibits some features of an international agreement (a treaty), but its status is in fact far from clear, and probably left deliberately ambiguous. This ambiguity is dangerous for Kosova, as the implementation of the agreement appears to be envisaged at the level of FRY law, rather than international law.
3. The agreement provides for limited legal personality for Kosova and actively denies its claim to statehood. The agreement does not constitute an interim arrangement towards statehood (as opposed to the case of Chechnya), but instead freezes the envisaged subordinate position of Kosova indefinitely.
4. Due to a complex and complicated division of powers among several organs, Kosova is reduced to a position of authority that is considerably less developed than was the case under the 1974 constitution. Most importantly, the legal personality of Kosova as an overall entity is reduced to a vanishing point. A claim to self-determination in the future is precluded by the fractionating of authority and its distribution to various layers of competence.
5. At a local level, very significant authority for self-governance is attributed to communes or municipalities, subject to certain important safeguards relating to the treatment of local minority populations. In practical terms, this is intended to balance the lack of legal personality and significant authority of Kosova as a whole over its own affairs throughout its territory. However, this practical autonomy at a sub-regional level is interfered with by involving Serbs and possibly others as a national group which is given (a) several layers of independent authority and (b) important veto rights over all aspects of decision-making in Kovova.
6. Generally, this agreement is heavily dominated by considerations of achieving a solution that is acceptable to the FRY/Serbia–even to the point of abandoning the international demand that at least the autonomy status of the 1974 constitution must be restored. Such a proposed solution sacrifices the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kosova to the perceived need of appeasing Belgrade. With the conclusion of the initial deal with Milosevic of 12/13 October, the representatives of Kosova will come under even heavier pressure to accept this sacrifice.
7. Conclusion: While the Republic of Kosova should not in principle oppose negotiations towards an interim arrangement, such an arrangement must not be concluded along the lines proposed by Ambassador Hill. Even to start negotiations on the basis of this proposal will inevitably yield an unacceptable result which prejudices Kovoa’s position irreparably, for now and in the future.

One of the underlying questions facing humanitarianism has always been that of how to avoid having ‘disasters’, of all kinds, develop into famines. According to de Waal (1997), the central features of successful famine prevention are the integrity of the civil service and the existence of a strong, visionary government. These are said to be the pillars of a political and social contract between vulnerable populations and the state. If one accepts this hypothesis, the question which would seem to follow is how we [1] might ‘get from here to there’ in supporting integrity and vision for reducing vulnerability in famine prone countries. The examples given by de Waal of successful famine prevention (India, Botswana, the liberation movements in Eritrea and Tigray) are of regimes that have founded their legitimacy on providing guarantees of famine prevention. Unfortunately, these examples give few clues as to how countries may nourish or recreate public service integrity and a political contract where the state lacks a history of accountability to its citizens, as is the case in most famine prone countries today. What is to be done where these pillars have either already crumbled or may have never been firmly established?

By definition, virtually all development interventions contain a welfare element. This welfare element involves the subsidized provision to a marginalized group or community by an external agency, physical, human, and/or social capital. Where marginalization is compounded by some type of natural disaster or civil conflict, the welfare element is justifiably high. Where impoverishment is less acute and more chronic, it is generally held that the welfare element should be minimized to avoid dependency and attack underlying structural constraints. However, it is clear that even mature southern nongovernmental organization’s development interventions involve some welfare element (see, Lovell, 1992). Indeed, the widely adopted micro-credit approach generally requires some external subsidy (Yaron, 1994). As the distinction between relief and development intervention becomes blurred, a more helpful way to type responses to impoverishment is needed. This paper suggests a continuum is more useful way of understanding various humanitarian responses: ranging from welfare-dominant, including material assistance for immediate need (e.g., provision of food), material assistance for intermediate need (e.g., provision of seed), through provision of social services (e.g., primary health-care education), single component interventions (e.g., micro-credit), integrated interventions (e.g., sub-sector promotion or microenterprise credit), to development- or self-reliance-dominant, via capacity building of new community networks and norms (i.e., building new forms of social capital). Then the paper sets out to analyse these approaches in terms of poverty and gender reach, operational costs, direct impact, secondary impact through growth linkages, and institutional sustainability.

This article focuses on corruption as an internal problem in emergency aid, i.e. misuse by the relief organisations themselves or by employees within the structures of the organisations. In many of the recipient countries of emergency aid corruption is an everyday phenomenon. The paper discusses structural components of the work of foreign emergency aid organisations which make it difficult for them to cope with the problem of misuse. Disbursement pressure and information barriers inside the emergency aid organisations are two of these components. Another factor is the inadequately maintained administrations of aid organisations which is due to a common condemnation of administration costs. If the assistance policy of foreign donors does not leave their local partners enough leeway to support the partners’ necessary structure and to pay qualified employees adequately, they encourage the development of corrupt structures within the partner organisations.

The magnitude of many recent complex emergencies has compelled UNHCR to consider the issue of conflict prevention. Such emergencies pose important questions about how to protect human life and human rights in crisis situations. Human rights abuses and violent conflict are the main reasons why people flee. Grappling with these problems can draw outsiders into areas traditionally seen as internal affairs. Countries in crisis want to preserve their sovereignty. Yet sovereignty should not be a shield, hiding abuses that might lead to major movements of people. Increasingly, international organizations, national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local leaders are working together creatively to address the abuses that can lead to refugee outflows and internal displacements.

Complex emergencies require the international community to respond quickly and efficiently with a variety of services. Experience has demonstrated that effective emergency response depends on coordination between nongovernmental organizations, governments, and international organizations. The increasing burden in recent years has prompted international organizations and states to reconsider how best to use the considerable capacity of the NGO community.

NGOs play an increasingly important role in humanitarian assistance and protection activities. In complex emergencies, national governments find it more and more difficult to provide, by themselves, the range of relief needed. Many situations present not only logistical difficulties, but political barriers to action. Nongovernmental organizations can, and do, help to fill the gap, playing a wide range of roles from early warning of human rights abuses to education and training for long-term self-sufficiency.

Norway provides an instructive example of one way to manage highly effective cooperation between government and the national NGO community. When I assumed my functions as High Commissioner, I identified emergency preparedness and response as one of the principal pillars of my office. Within this context, UNHCR and Norway entered into a new and closer relationship, through an emergency staff standby arrangement managed by the Norwegian Refugee Council. Through this arrangement, my office has been able to witness very directly the important and cooperative relationship between governments, international organizations, and NGOs.

Such creative arrangements are one of the tools that UNHCR can use to accomplish its key task of protecting people in peril. This report highlights the challenges posed by complex emergencies and suggests some ways in which the rights and well-being of vulnerable populations can be better safeguarded.

There is currently considerable interest in improving the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance through the promotion of principles of good practice and codes of conduct. This paper places these initiatives, and particularly the Code of Conduct or the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, in the context of endeavours within the humanitarian sector to address the underlying values that effectively govern the behaviour of practitioners. The paper interprets this as the development of organisational ethical ethos and demonstrates that creating an ethos requires the convergence of two separate ethical systems, the practitioners and the organisations, and how this is best achieved through dialogue and discussion. The paper concludes by affirming the initiative to improve practice by establishing universally observed ethical standards but that to be successful these standards in the form of the Code of Conduct must be ‘owned’ equally by the agency and its personnel.